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Appellants Utah State Bar and Stephen Hutchinson 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Bar") will 
respond herein to certain of the arguments raised by 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant Brian M. Barnard ("Barnard") in 
his Brief. 
I. ARGUMENT ON BAR'S APPEAL 
A. The Bar is Not a State Agency. 
The principal ground upon which Barnard argues that the 
Bar is a state agency and thus subject to the provisions of 
the Archives and Records, Services and Information Practices 
Act, Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 63-2-59, et seq. (the "Records 
Act") and the Public and Private Writings Act, Utah Code 
Annotated, Sec. 78-26-1, et seq. (the "Writings Act") is that 
all of the powers granted to the Bar "come either from the 
state Legislature or from the state Judiciary." [Barnard's 
Brief, p. 12] 
The fact that the Bar was created by and its powers are 
derived from the Legislature or Supreme Court has little, if 
anything, to do with whether the Bar is a state agency. For 
example, the Legislature authorized the creation of 
corporations. A corporation has only such powers as are 
provided by statute. See, Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 16-10-3 
and 16-10-4. That doesn't make corporations agencies of the 
state. Barnard's argument was rejected in Utah Technology 
Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406 (Utah 1986), 
discussed in the Bar's initial Brief. This Court determined 
that the Utah Technology Finance Corporation was not a state 
agency even though it was created by the Legislature, was 
funded with tax funds and was subject to strict regulation and 
control by the state. 
Barnard further argues that the Bar is a state agency 
because it has the power to regulate the legal profession 
through the admission and discipline of lawyers. The fallacy 
of Barnard's argument is twofold. First, the Bar can only 
make recommendations to the Supreme Court concerning the 
admission and discipline of attorneys. More importantly, the 
mere fact that the Supreme Court has delegated to the Bar 
certain responsibilities with respect to the admission and 
discipline of attorneys and that the Bar, in fulfilling those 
responsibilities, acts as an arm or agent of the Court doesn't 
mean that the Bar is thereby transformed into a state agency 
for all purposes. There is a big difference between being a 
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Barnard suggests that if the Bar's position is 
simply that the Bar is not a State agency for all 
purposes, but for some purposes that the Bar must 
concede that some disclosure is required regarding 
some functions of the Bar. This is not the Bar's 
position. The Bar concedes that it acts as an arm 
or agent of the Supreme Court for some purposes. 
It does not concede that this fact makes the Bar 
a state agency. 
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the Bar's initial Brief, the Bar has more of the attributes of 
a professional association. It owns its own property, it pays 
property taxes, it elects its own commissioners and is 
governed by its own by-laws. It performs a number of 
functions which have nothing to do with the admission or 
discipline of attorneys or any governmental function. These 
attributes are totally inconsistent with any notion that the 
Bar is a State agency. The Bar is therefore not subject to 
the Records Act or Writings Act. 
B. The Records Act Does Not Apply to the Judiciary. 
Barnard fails to respond to the Bar's argument in its 
initial Brief that the Records Act only applies to the 
executive branch of state government and, therefore, is 
inapplicable to the Bar which is an arm of the Supreme Court. 
Thus, Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 63-2-68.1(4), requires the 
State Records Committee (comprised solely of executive branch 
personnel) to make available classification review upon the 
request of the legislative or judicial branches of state 
government. Similarly, Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 63-2-79, 
requires the archivist (an executive branch employee) to 
assist and advise the legislative and judicial branches and 
provide them program services upon their request. In fact, 
the executive director of administrative services has 
promulgated administrative rules to implement the Records Act. 
Utah Administrative Code, Archives Rule R3-1-1, et seq. Rule 
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rule and related, procedures or parts thereof as 
they desire. 
Clearly the administrator charged with implementing the 
Records Act doesn't believe iu v. r ies tu tne judicial or 
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C. The Statutes Cannot Be Constitutionally Applied to 
the Bar. 
Barnard does not really face up the issue of whether the 
Records Act and Writings Act can be constitutional^ applied 
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 Initially, Barnard argues that this Court should 
disregard the constitutionality argument on the 
. basis that it was not raised below or in. the Bar's 
Statement of Issues Presented fox Review. Barnard 
previously filed a Motion to strike the 
constitutionality argument from the Bar's Brief on 
the same basis. This Court decided it would 
consider the constitutionality argument and deni ed 
the Motion. 
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in many instances, controlled by statutes." [Barnard Brief, 
p. 28-29] Barnard then proceeds to cite Legislative 
enactments which are not even analogous to the statutes 
involved in the present case. 
Barnard absolutely ignores the fact that Article V, 
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution prohibits the Legislative 
or Executive branches of government from exercising any power 
properly belonging to the judiciary and that under Article 
VIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution, the Supreme Court is 
given the sole power to govern the practice of law. Thus, the 
Utah Supreme Court has the sole power to regulate the Bar and 
its members. See, In the Matter of Washington State Bar 
Association, 548 P.2d 310 (Wash. 1976); Ex Parte Auditor of 
Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682 (Ken. 1980). It is up to this 
court to determine what records of the Bar, if any, shall be 
made public and to specify the conditions and procedures under 
which the records should be made public. 
In this regard, Barnard concedes that the courts should 
"have discretion to seal Court documents." [Barnard Brief, p. 
30] Barnard contends, without any authority, that there is a 
big difference between court documents and records of 
employees1 salaries. However, neither the Records Act nor 
the Writings Act make any such distinction. If those statutes 
apply to the judiciary, they purport to deny the judiciary the 
discretion to seal court documents. The Writings Act 
expressly includes as a public writing "judicial records". 
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Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 78-26-1(2). The Writings Act then 
goes on to provide that "except as otherwise expressly 
provided by statute" each citizen has the right to inspect and 
make copies of public writings. 
In short, the Bar is an arm of the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court has the sole power and authority to govern and 
regulate the Bar. The Supreme Court does not share that power 
with the Legislature. It is not for the Legislature to 
dictate to the Supreme Court what records of the Bar shall be 
made public, or to prescribe the manner in which that 
determination is made. 
II. ARGUMENT ON BARNARDfS CROSS-APPEAL 
A. Barnard is Not Entitled to Exemplary Damages. 
Barnard argues that the trial court erred in determining 
that the Bar's alleged violation of the Records Act was not 
willful and in refusing to award exemplary damages. This 
argument is simply wrong even if it is assumed the Bar 
violated the Records Act. 
In the first place, the statute upon which Barnard 
relies for an award of exemplary damages is not applicable. 
Sec. 63-2-88(2), Utah Code Annotated provides: 
Any responsible authority who willfully violates 
any provision of this Act shall, in addition to 
those remedies provided under Subsection (1), be 
liable for exemplary damages of not less than $100 
nor more than $1,000 for each violation. 
[Emphasis added] 
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The term "responsible authority", in turn, is defined by Utah 
Code Annotated, Sec. 63-2-61(8) as: 
. . . Any state office or state official 
established by law or executive order as the body 
responsible for the collection, use or supervision 
of any set of data on individuals or summary data. 
[Emphasis added] 
The exemplary damage statute is not applicable either to the 
Utah State Bar or to Stephen Hutchinson because neither has 
been "established by law or executive order as the body 
responsible for the collection, use or supervision" of the 
data which Barnard seeks. 
Second, the trial court acted well within its discretion 
in determining that any violation was in good faith. In this 
regard, it was Barnard's burden to show the violation was 
willful. To the contrary, it was clear that any violation was 
in the good faith belief that the Bar was not required to 
disclose the information. In fact, the Bar actually did 
disclose salary ranges to Barnard. 
B. Barnard is Not Entitled to an Award of Attorneys1 
Fees. 
Barnard erroneously argues that the trial court erred as 
a matter of law in refusing to award Barnard attorneys1 fees. 
Barnard argues that under Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 63-2-
88(1), attorneys1 fees are mandated. However, in quoting that 
statute, Barnard omits the crucial language which makes it 
clear that attorneys1 fees can only be awarded in an action 
against the state. Thus, Section 63-2-88(1) reads, in full: 
8 
Any responsible authority who violates any 
provision of this act shall be liable to any 
person, suffering damage as a result thereof, and 
the person damaged may bring an action against the 
state to recover any damages sustained, plus costs 
incurred and reasonable attorney fees. [Emphasis 
added] 
Barnard did not commence this action against "the state". 
Further, even if the statute were to be interpreted as 
authorizing attorneys1 fees against a "responsible authority", 
neither the Utah State Bar nor Stephen Hutchinson fall within 
that term as previously demonstrated. 
Barnard also argues that the trial court erred because 
it did not enter any findings of fact explaining the court's 
reasons for not awarding attorneys' fees. [Barnard Brief, p. 
26] This argument is frivolous. Findings of fact are not 
required with respect to Summary Judgment motions. Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a); Stewart v. United States, 716 
F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1982) cert, den. 105 S.Ct. 432. 
Consequently, there is simply no basis upon which to 
award Barnard attorneys' fees. 
C. Barnard is Not Entitled to Have the Fifth 
Affirmative Defense in the Answer Stricken. 
Incredibly, Barnard asks this Court for an Order 
striking the Bar's Fifth Affirmative Defense in its Answer on 
the basis that the defense constitutes a violation of Rule 11 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is "an improper and 
insufficient defense" and contains impertinent and scandalous 
matter. Aside from the fact that Barnard never presented any 
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evidence in the court below which would support his 
contentions other than the evidence from which the court 
determined that the statutes had been violated, the issue of 
striking the affirmative defense is simply not before the 
Court. Barnard cross-appealed from the Summary Judgment 
entered by the District Court to the extent that the Summary 
Judgment refused to award exemplary damages and attorneys1 
fees. [Barnard Brief, Ex. C] The Summary Judgment made no 
determination concerning striking the defense nor did 
Barnard's Motion For Summary Judgment even request that the 
affirmative defense be stricken. [Barnard Brief, Ex. A] 3 
Further, in Barnard's statement of issues on the cross-appeal, 
the only issues raised were the exemplary damages and 
attorneys' fees issues. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it respectfully submitted 
that the Summary Judgment in favor of Barnard should be 
reversed and the case remanded with instructions to enter 
Judgment in favor of the Bar. 
3
 Barnard had requested, in a Motion to Dismiss, that 
the affirmative defense be stricken. No ruling was 
ever made on that Motion and it is not before the 
Court. 
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